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Abstract 
 
The objective of this analysis is to provide a reinterpretation of the decline of the 
Lancashire cotton textile industry during the twentieth century. Its principal concerns 
are with the governance structure of the industry, the resultant capital structures of 
firms and the constraints thereby imposed on the activities of entrepreneurs. Its 
central thesis is that ownership of the industry, and the redistribution of ownership 
claims during booms and slumps, imposed pressures and constraints on decision-
makers. These financial constraints dominated the strategic questions of re-equipment 
and modernisation. 
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Capital Ownership, Capital Structure, and Capital Markets: Financial Constraints and 
the Decline of the Lancashire Cotton Textile Industry, c1880-c.1965. 
 
 
Introduction 
Two issues have dominated the historiography of the Lancashire textile industry in recent 
decades. These are whether entrepreneurs were rational or not in the light of the constraints 
they faced and, related to that issue, the causes of the industry’s decline.2 It is not the purpose 
of this article to review the intricacies of these debates. However, it does seek to comment 
upon them in the light of new evidence from recent research into the ownership of the 
industry and its financial performance.3 Broadly, the argument that arises from these studies 
is that ownership and governance structures placed financial constraints on decision- makers. 
Also, the governance structure of the Lancashire cotton textile industry that developed during 
the nineteenth century had far-reaching consequences for its performance in the twentieth 
century.  
This interpretation has some similarity with others that have contributed to the current 
state of the debates. For example it acknowledges the importance of major variations in 
demand and that in other respects the cotton industry of Lancashire evolved in a path-
dependent, incremental, fashion.  However there are several important differences. First, it is 
not the case that the type of firm structure which evolved in the nineteenth century was 
inimical to progress and competitiveness in the twentieth century.4  Indeed, an earlier paper 
demonstrated that the choice of structure was rational in the light of the profitability of 
alternatives.5 Second, the pattern of firm structure did not restrict the range of profitable or 
feasible technological options available to firms in the twentieth century.6 Third, although 
Lazonick was correct to identify the managerial/ entrepreneurial split as being at the crux of 
debate,7 he did not directly examine the changing impact of governance structures on the 
evolution of the industry and its consequences for capital structure and business strategy.8 
However as will be demonstrated in this analysis, governance structures and their associated 
financial constraints, were the crucial legacies of the nineteenth century.  
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Collapse in demand in export markets after 1920 and the emergence of excess 
capacity are well acknowledged aspects of the problems facing the industry. In addition, as 
shown below, the new owners of the industry placed demands on cash flow in the form of 
repayments of loan finance, and other capital, dividend and interest payments. After 1945, 
these problems were compounded by unhelpful taxation rules. When problems in export 
markets and over-capacity are combined with these governance-imposed constraints, the 
interpretation presented here provides new insight into the inability of entrepreneurs to 
formulate responses to external threats and industry decline. This interpretation is also a 
variant of the ‘early-start’ thesis that has been used to explain poor competitiveness for the 
British economy as a whole.9 Unlike the standard ‘early start’ thesis, the explanation here is 
based on the use of capacity created in the nineteenth century and its associated system of 
finance. These then formed a basis for a series of re-orderings in financial claims as the 
industry staggered from one crisis to another in the twentieth.10 Previous studies have 
recognised the extent of this financial crisis and as a result have concentrated on its most 
prominent aspect, the intervention of the Bank of England and the formation of the 
Lancashire Cotton Corporation (hereafter, LCC) during the period 1929-31.11 The empirical 
aspect of the present study, which focuses on financing and dividend policies of typical firms 
(tables 1,2, and 3) concentrates on other major firms whose strategies have been neglected to 
a certain extent, especially in the interwar period. These firms were also selected for 
comparability through time, whose records were consistently available from comparable 
sources during the major sub-periods of the study.12
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two examines the changes 
in governance structures and ownership that emerged in the industry during the pre-1914 
period and analyses how this led to an over-commitment of financial and physical resources 
in the industry. Section three evaluates the impact of pre-war governance structures on the 
ability of entrepreneurs to formulate recovery strategies after the onset of crisis in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Particular attention is paid to explaining how financial constraints limited the 
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opportunities for increasingly urgent re-equipment. Section four re-examines this relationship 
in the period from the end of World War II to the 1960s and shows that entrepreneurs 
remained subject to a similar set of financially induced constraints. Section five reassesses the 
current state of the debates on Lancashire textiles in  light of the preceding discussion.  
 
II. Capital Markets and Governance Before 1914. 
The boom-slump cycle and continued underlying growth of the industry before 1914 led to 
important and decisive changes in corporate governance. There were several important 
aspects to this. First, capital market inefficiency followed directly from the vicissitudes of the 
trade cycle. Second, market imperfections enabled promotional speculators to engage in 
systematic wealth transfers. Third, as a consequence of the first two aspects, capital was 
misallocated in promotional booms and as a result there was always latent excess capacity. 
Finally, the new owners of the industry shunned corporate saving and instead accumulated 
wealth privately. Each of these aspects is discussed in more detail below. The discussion 
relies on evidence from previous studies and also evidence on the financial policies of typical 
Lancashire companies. Table 1 summarises the dividend and borrowing policies for a sample 
of these firms. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
  For many modern economists, financial markets can only become more efficient as 
information flows faster and entry barriers break down.13 Whether or not Britain had 
established efficient capital markets before 1914 has been the source of some debate although 
research into this question is underdeveloped empirically.14 As far as the capital markets of 
Lancashire were concerned some clear evidence has recently emerged. This evidence 
suggests that market efficiency declined during the period.15 Centred on Oldham, the 
Lancashire stock market began in the early 1870s on the back of a flotation boom of dozens 
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of companies underpinned by the mass participation of the local factory-based population.16 
In the first half of the 1890s, the system met with a crisis. Depressed demand was a function 
of the loss of the Indian and other Eastern markets, which followed from the depreciation of 
silver relative to gold on the world market.17 Capital market efficiency declined following 
this slump. A survey of annual returns has shown that whilst the typical company of the 
1880s had hundreds of transactions in its shares, by the early 1890s the number of 
transactions fell to only a handful.18 As the market could not match buyers and sellers, prices 
could not reflect true values.19 As we shall see, this had important consequences for the 
allocation of capital. 
Meanwhile, the 1890s slump in values also altered the social ownership of the 
industry. By the 1900s participation had narrowed and large, wealthy dealers dominated the 
market.20 Promotional booms facilitated this process. Such booms, for example in the late 
1870s and mid-1880s provided opportunities for promoters to float companies at inflated 
prices and sell their holdings for large personal profits.21 This was a rational strategy from 
their point of view since rising efficient scale, particularly lengthening mule spinning 
carriages, meant that it paid to build new mills in times of boom rather than extend existing 
buildings.22 Meanwhile accumulation of private fortunes meant that next-generation mills 
could be floated using a narrower range of shareholders.23 Thus subsequent booms 
compounded market inefficiency further and created new opportunities for systematic wealth 
transfers.24 This was especially the case in the pronounced and protracted boom after 1896 
that continued with brief interruptions until 1914. Accounting profit rates grew steadily from 
1896 onwards and peaked in the boom of 1907.25 In turn, this prompted an unprecedented mill 
building boom in the period 1904-8, centred on the Oldham district.26 By the 1900s, 
groupings of individually controlled mills became more clearly established.27 The proprietors 
of these groups of mills possessed access to financial resources based on reputation and 
personal contact.28 As a result they were individually involved in the flotation and 
directorships of up to a dozen mill companies.29 These changes created a highly unusual 
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system of governance based on diversified directors and non-diversified shareholders (in the 
conventional model of Anglo Saxon economies it is the other way round). Hence the rise of 
powerful directors was not consistent with the rise of managerial capitalism, rather an unusual 
Lancashire variant of personal capitalism.30 It was also persistent during the period of decline. 
The annual returns of these companies in the 1950s revealed similar interlocking directorships 
and a rump of residual small private shareholders.31
There were several important consequences of these changes in ownership. First, the 
activities of the mill promoters led to the centralisation of capital ownership and the industry 
increasingly fell under the control of speculative entrepreneurs.32  As the post 1896 boom 
developed, their skills at company promotion came to the fore. Profits from existing mills 
were channelled via the estates of these proprietary capitalists into personally administered 
flotations or acquisitions of other concerns.33 They used individual contacts, cross 
directorships and shareholdings to develop ‘empires’ of otherwise un-integrated businesses.34 
The late 1890s witnessed the rise of cliques of directors and also the emergence of new 
combines, such as the Fine Cotton Spinners & Doublers Association.35 Strategy formulation 
became the exclusive preserve of these individuals whilst managers became nominee officials 
at plant level, trusted only with routine. In other words, imperfections in the capital market 
led to the rise of owner-managed firms that precluded the emergence of professional 
managerial hierarchies.36  
A second consequence was that ownership interests were able to impose limits on 
free cash flow available to managers. As equity holders they demanded high dividends and 
also used extensive loan finance to fund new flotations. As shown in table 1, typical 
companies paid out 67% of their available profits as dividends and the typical debt to equity 
ratio was close to 1 during this period. Although there is little comparable evidence of 
calculated dividend pay-out ratios for other industries, it is reasonable to suppose that 
divestment was higher in Lancashire than elsewhere, since equity capital growth rates were 
below national averages.37 Much of the debt to finance new mills came from cash balances in 
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existing mills, and were often used to underpin inter-firm control by cliques of directors.38 
Although these investments occurred without the consent of the residual shareholders,39 they 
still reflected the dependence of the industry on local finance, a situation that changed after 
1918. This system of finance depended on strong subsequent cash flow to repay loans and 
also on the willingness of entrepreneurs and promoters to recycle cash from dividends into 
new flotations.  
A further consequence of ownership structure was that the new capacity created by 
these 'gangs of promoters' destroyed the profit margins of installed capacity and left the 
industry over-committed in subsequent slumps.40 The activities of promotional speculators 
was important because as a result of the 1907 mill building boom, capacity in the industry 
reached levels that subsequently proved unsustainable. One contemporary estimate was that 
by 1935, there were still 13.5 million surplus spindles in the industry of which 9.5 were in the 
American section and 4 million in the Egyptian section.41  For 1935, this represents plant 
utilisation of just 69% in the spinning industry.42  An alternative way of interpreting this 
figure is as follows: installed capacity in 1935 was approximately 47 million spindles, but 
there was only enough demand to keep 33.5 million spindles (installed capacity minus excess 
capacity) fully employed.  Even as early as the 1880s the industry already contained over 40 
million spindles.43  In other words, the capacity that was installed by the promoters in the 
boom period of 1896-1914 was all potentially surplus in the light of the performance of the 
industry after 1920. However, if Lancashire’s entrepreneurs had not responded to the rapid 
growth of export demand pre-1914 they may have been accused of  ‘failure’. Any expenditure 
on plant must be governed by the expectation that the future (but uncertain) returns will 
outweigh the cost of these assets. Where expectations differ it may be possible to recover 
these costs by selling the asset to other businessmen. For the first time this drew in significant 
finance from outside Lancashire. As one authority has suggested,44 with the development of 
capital markets capitalists shed their entrepreneurial role and entrepreneurs shed their 
financing function. The 1919-21 re-flotation boom provides a classic example of this 
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divergence of interests. The over-capacity problem was compounded because corporate 
growth rates were strongest where private or family control was exercised and weakest where 
there was dependency on regional stock markets.45  Yet it was the latter case, best exemplified 
by Oldham, that led to the greatest expansion of capacity at industry level. 
The final important consequence of the industry’s ownership structure was for the 
technological development of the industry. Because the commercial and technical advantages 
of ring spinning and the automatic loom were not yet established,46 entrepreneurs ploughed 
the resources from the pre-1914 booms into specialised establishments using traditional 
technologies. It was for this reason that whilst there were few advocates of integrated 
production before 1914, technical issues associated with disintegration came to the fore in the 
1920s and 1930s. Thus the critique of specialisation from within the industry, as presented by 
Lazonick, came from technical experts and managers rather than entrepreneurs.47 The 
governance structure inherited from the nineteenth century meant the opinions of mill 
managers were much constrained by the actions of the directors. During the pre-1914 period, 
industry ownership and its consequences dominated the issue of technical choice.  
 
III.  Financial Paralysis, 1918-1939. 
After a sharp and very important boom in 1919-21, Lancashire cotton lost ground in several 
important overseas markets. Particularly significant was the loss of the Indian market and 
Japanese competition in third markets.48 These facts are well known. When considered in 
conjunction with the ownership structure described in the previous section, together with 
further evidence on financial strategies (table 2), new insights are offered. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
There were several important consequences of this latest twist in the boom-slump 
cycle that prevented the industry from recovering, as it had been able to do before the war, for 
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example, after 1896. The first consequence was that, to varying degrees, all firms were 
subject to high fixed charges as a result of the refinancing strategies adopted during the 1919-
20 boom. In 1919 entrepreneurs faced boom conditions even more dramatic than those of 
1907. However, unlike previous booms, it was wider margins rather than increases in demand 
which was instrumental.49  Also a shortage of equipment and building supplies prevented a 
new wave of mill construction. These features deterred further investment in physical mill 
capital that could have only made the subsequent over-capacity problem worse.  Instead, 
firms were re-capitalised such that the capitalisation of the typical company increased by a 
factor of three. Much of the re-capitalisation was supported by new long-term debt finance.50 
Table 2 provides examples of the typical ratio of debt to equity in 1920. For these firms debt 
represented two thirds of the value of shareholders assets. Levels of borrowing were lower in 
1920 than it had typically been prior to 1914 although they increased to a comparable level, 
as the crisis of the 1920s and 1930s became more severe (table 2). Evidence is presented in 
the discussion below, but it should be stressed at this stage that these valuations were based 
on dubious assumptions. Some companies, such as Crosses & Winkworth, borrowed to 
extreme levels in 1919-20 (table 2).  Ignoring the dividend requirements of ordinary 
shareholders for the moment, these refinancing strategies had the effect of also increasing 
fixed charges threefold. The annual cost increase represented by fixed interest and 
depreciation charges was £43,233 for a typical 100,000-spindle mill. On the basis of its 
average output, that translated into a 2.8d increase in cost per pound on 30s yarns and a 12.2d 
increase for 100s yarns.51 To put these figures into context, the average net profit per 
company even at the height of the 1919 boom was only £14,786. Margins for 32s yarns were 
29.88d per pound in 1920, but then fell sharply at first and then steadily to 2.98d by 1931.52  
Linked to these increases in fixed charges was the second important feature of the 
boom: a further redistribution of ownership rights.53 Money capital was invested through the 
re-capitalisation of existing mills with bonus issues and new loan finance. Like the 1907 
boom, these re-flotations were speculative and depended heavily on the reputations and 
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contacts of the entrepreneur.54 As in all previous booms, new capital was used to finance high 
dividends to equity shareholders, in particular those promotional capitalists who used stock 
market quotations as fast exit routes for their own investments.55 Unlike previous booms, 
however,  money was attracted from syndicates from outside the local area, 56 into what 
turned out to be a more fundamental mis-allocation of capital. When the boom turned to bust 
after 1921, as in 1892-5, calls were made on shareholders and exhortations made to lenders.57 
Whilst individuals were bankrupted, businesses survived under new owners. Specifically, the 
banks became the new owners of the industry in place of speculative capitalists.58 Their 
priorities did not follow from any expertise in cotton, and were dictated by the recovery of 
capital rather than the strategic restructuring of the industry.59 Even when original 
entrepreneurs remained, the financial claims of this new group effectively ended local control 
of a large section of the industry.60 Again, as with the pre-war business cycle, market 
efficiency was reduced and the social ownership of capital was redistributed.  
The consequences of the revised 1920 ownership structure of the industry were 
serious and made immediate recovery impossible. The first and most important aspect was 
that firms could not retrench due to their financial structures and were thus also prevented 
from pursuing re-equipment based recovery strategies. Retrenchment meant stabilising cash 
flows through cost cutting or asset disposals.61  However, neither of these strategies was 
feasible in post 1920 conditions. Costs had been driven up by higher interest and depreciation 
charges and they were unalterable without a further re-ordering of the financial claims of 
equity and loan investors. Asset sales were the least attractive option to loan creditors. The 
main reason was that realisable values were low.  These low values were due to a 
combination of factors. The collapse in export markets had created over-capacity and hence 
there was no second hand market. The assets involved were highly specific, especially 
machinery, and in many cases had reached an old vintage by 1930.62 New but more 
expensive technology was available. Book values were therefore well below replacement 
cost. Thus the only alternative valuation available to financial claim holders was the 
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economic value of the assets in use. As a correspondent wrote, ‘the real security for many 
outstanding loans in our depressed industries is little else but the earning power of the assets 
pledged’ (Economist, 1930, p.394). Such valuations require forecasts of the future earning 
capacity of the assets. Where realisable values are low, forecasts of the risk adjusted present 
value of future cash flows do not have to be especially high for a rational decision-maker to 
support continued investment. Moreover, these forecasts were imbued with a degree of 
optimism as a result of prior experience of the trade cycle. For example some recalled the 
depression of the 1890s and argued that the causes of that depression (high world gold prices) 
were also part of the present difficulties. As one industry authority, writing in the 1930s, put 
it, ‘though the circumstances and events of that depression (the 1890s) were different in a few 
respects, the essential causes were practically the same as the causes of the present 
depression’.63 These commentators noted that when gold prices fell in the period 1897-1914, 
the cotton industry had experienced the greatest boom in its history.64  
A second consequence of the 1920 ownership structure was that the re-distribution of 
ownership rights during the boom of 1919-20, reduced the competitiveness of those firms that 
might otherwise have been able to best compete in the revised world economic conditions. 
The newer the assets, the higher the revaluation and the higher the increase in fixed costs. 
Hence the best-equipped mills of 1920 became the most financially embarrassed by 1930 
(Economist, 1930, p. 667). As shown in table 2, Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust and Crosses 
& Winkworth became heavily over-borrowed as losses reduced the equity base of these 
companies still further. In 1919, these were both companies with relatively new assets and in 
markets not especially vulnerable to overseas competition. By 1930, their share values and 
market capitalisations had fallen to extreme levels.65  
 A further consequence was that industry leaders resorted to collusive behaviour. This 
behaviour followed from the restrictions on exit imposed by the revised governance structure. 
Price fixing schemes were in operation between 1923-4, 1926-7, 1930, and then in every year 
from 1933.66 Initially attempts were made to secure industry wide schemes.  However, 
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because these failed to take into account the widely differing experiences of the industry’s 
two major sections, American and Egyptian, they were only short lived.67
In addition, financial paralysis prevented Lancashire entrepreneurs from taking 
advantage of major opportunities offered by technical developments to restore 
competitiveness through re-equipment. Newer technologies were based on faster throughput 
and in particular the invention of high speed drafting in 1914. The technical dominance of 
these new methods was not established until after 1914, and in British conditions investment 
in new technology only became a potential commercial option in the 1920s and 1930s. Prior 
to this breakthrough before the First World War productivity in ring and mule spinning 
increased at approximately equal rates.68 Only in the spinning of very fine yarns did mule 
spinning retain its advantages, including the period after 1945.69 From 1920, high drafting 
and other improvements in intermediate processes such as doffing and winding provided 
opportunities to speed up production70 and offered savings in areas of traditional labour 
intensity.71  A survey in 1932 noted three cases of ring spinning mills replacing low draft with 
high draft spinning, resulting in average improvements in labour productivity of  49.3 %.72 By 
now industry commentators recognised that ‘re-equipment was needed on a vast scale’.73 From 
1931, Japanese producers adopted these techniques. This, together with competitive de-
valuations of the Yen, explained the loss of Lancashire’s traditional Far Eastern markets.74 
Without adequate finance, technological advances were always threats and never opportunities 
for Lancashire firms.  
Finally, because profit streams were unable to cover fixed charges, the financial 
distress of many large firms had reached extreme levels by 1930, effectively ruling out new 
strategic investment. However, the tradition of independence of many cotton companies from 
bank finance75 meant the financial institutions lacked the managerial expertise required to 
effect restructuring. In any case, as noted above, individualistic control of mills had long 
prevented the emergence of professional managerial hierarchies, and remaining businessmen 
instinctively favoured industry co-operation to closure and rationalisation. As demonstrated 
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earlier, the new financing structure of the industry placed restrictions on free cash flow 
through high fixed charges. When the dividend requirement was added, managers were left 
with no available cash to fund re-organisation and re-equipment. Despite the collapse in 
profits and heavy indebtedness of the 1920s, dividends were slow to adjust to lower levels of 
average profits.76 As table 2 shows, the average dividend payout ratio was 84% of available 
profits. Some companies in the sample, for example, Brierfield and Rylands,  paid dividends 
greater than the available profits whilst another, Crosses & Winkworth, paid dividends 
notwithstanding aggregate losses.77 It was these restrictions on cash flow imposed by 
financial policies and governance structures that informed the response of the industry to its 
problems, especially the problem of over-capacity. A survey of the industry conducted by 
John Ryan, managing director of the LCC, estimated the average value of debt per company 
to be £108,350.78 At these levels, assuming all the profits earned subsequently were applied 
to retire debt, the earliest year at which firms would be free of debt would have been 1947.79 
Meanwhile the level of debt remained a significant exit barrier at a time when restructuring 
became increasingly urgent.80
 
IV. The Impact of Equity and Fiscal Financial Constraints, 1945-60. 
Lancashire firms did succeed in repaying the excess debt that had dominated their balance 
sheets in the aftermath of the 1920 re-constructions, notwithstanding the continuing demand 
for dividends after 1945. Table 3 shows the borrowing levels and dividend policies for a 
sample of Lancashire firms between 1945-60. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
There were two main reasons for their success in repaying debt. One was that there was a 
minor world recovery in the late 1930s, together with the military demands of the Second 
World War that guaranteed demand and profitable contracts.81 The other reason was that 
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many companies took advantage of this breathing space to re-structure their balance sheets 
again, this time by converting debt to equity as well as cancelling capital that was 
unrepresented by assets.82 By 1950, following the sharp post war boom, the industry had 
become predominantly equity financed (table 3). As suggested earlier, the pattern of equity 
ownership that emerged at the turn of the century was still in place in the 1950s. It now 
became a new constraint on the recovery of the industry. Also, government taxation policy 
discriminated against Lancashire companies, further restricting the supply of capital for 
reinvestment. These two issues are now explored in turn. 
 The typical investor in the equity of 1950s cotton companies was loyal and not well 
diversified. Shareholders tended to be old. Alternatively, shares were held in trust where the 
original investors had died. Either way they did not monitor the activities of the board, whose 
directors typically controlled significant blocks of shares.83 The narrow shareholder base was 
partly a consequence of past patterns of promotional activities, as discussed earlier. At the 
same time the continued loyalty of some shareholders created a tendency towards thin 
trading, and thereby prevented others from exiting their investments.84 The consequence of 
this ownership structure was that management teams were not motivated to improve the 
performance of the firm through the normal processes of accountability to shareholders. 
Another effect was that shareholders were hungry for dividends.85 In a thinly traded market 
they were unable to manufacture cash flow from their investments through selling a portion 
of their holding. Hence the payment of regular dividends was important even though the 
fiscal rules in successive budgets in the 1950s penalised such distributions through effective 
double taxation.86  
There was a long tradition in the industry of paying out the majority of profit 
available to shareholders as dividend. As we have seen, this trend was prominent in the pre- 
1914 period (table 1), with the result that firms had little free cash flow and managerial 
hierarchies did not develop at plant level. In the 1920s and 1930s, this haemorrhaging of 
money capital contrasted with the industry’s reluctance, discussed earlier, to reduce its 
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physical capital. As noted above, where profits were made during this period, they were 
quickly applied in dividends. 
 Although lower than pre-war levels high dividend payments continued despite the tax 
disincentives and the increasing urgency of re-equipment. At the industry level, the profit 
distributions of Lancashire companies was significantly higher than the average for the 
economy as a whole during the 1950s. In line with government tax incentives, firms in other 
industries ploughed back profit and invested in new equipment.87  Only a small number of 
Lancashire companies, for example, John Bright, Shiloh Spinners and Smith & Nephew 
pursued growth strategies in the 1950s. These companies retained more profit, raised 
additional funds from City investment institutions and increased their asset values. They had 
larger boards with committed, proactive directors rather than the paralysing governance 
structures of typical Lancashire companies.88  
 In addition to the governance constraint, there were issues associated with the 
taxation system that prevented restructuring and re-equipment strategies being followed by 
Lancashire entrepreneurs. The Chairman of Highams Ltd, provided a useful summary of the 
problems caused by the taxation system in his 1950 Statement: ‘...the incidence of the present 
rate of Income and Profits Tax and their crippling effect on capital development, combined 
with Purchase Tax are factors which cannot be ignored.89 Of course, high rates of tax per se 
will always discourage investment. However, in Lancashire the effect was more perverse than 
usual due to the asymmetry between tax incentives for investment and the available profit 
streams against which investment incentive could be offset. Because investment allowances 
were given as deductions against taxable profits, investment decision-makers would have to 
be confident of sufficient profits to take advantage of them. For example, a company with 
profits of £1m per year subject to corporate taxation at 50%, could make investments in new 
fixed assets of £2m per year and avoid tax altogether. However, marginal expenditure over 
£2m would not be subject to any tax based incentives.90 For a company like the LCC, with 
uncertain pre-tax profits averaging £3.2m between 1949-64 and required capital expenditure 
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in excess of £62m, there was no benefit in this scheme.91 If the LCC was typical, profit levels 
for the industry, especially after 1952, were too low relative to the required investment. 
Unlike companies in other sectors of the economy where re-structuring was not a pre-
requisite for growth, Lancashire firms had to bear high rates of tax, but without the 
compensatory relief of deductions from investment allowances. When combined with the 
dividend demands of shareholders discussed earlier, it is clear that there were financial 
constraints on investment behaviour in addition to those documented elsewhere in the 
previous literature. 
 
V. Discussion and Conclusions. 
By examining three neglected aspects in the current debate, capital ownership, capital 
structure, and capital markets, the previous discussion has aimed to offer a new perspective 
on the decline of the Lancashire textile industry. It is intended that these aspects will be seen 
as incremental to other causes of decline highlighted elsewhere. Monetary conditions and 
changes in world demand were of obvious importance but beyond the control of the typical 
entrepreneur. It is therefore appropriate to concentrate the discussion on entrepreneurial 
responses to externally driven crises. 
 Much prior debate has revolved around the definition of the entrepreneur, the scope 
of and constraints on entrepreneurial activities. Whilst it is possible to agree that constraints 
existed, the question is which were the most important? Sandberg argued that entrepreneurs 
operated rationally within the constraints imposed upon them, for example by the structure of 
the industry. Taking a Schumpeterian view, Lazonick argued that it was up to entrepreneurs 
to remove these constraints but that they had a problem in Lancashire because ex ante 
horizontal specialisation prevented co-ordinated decision making.92 There are two problems 
with this view. First, although not dealt with in the discussion above, there is a presupposition 
about the desirability of vertical integration.93 Secondly, if for the moment the desirability of 
vertical integration is accepted, it is not clear how the ex ante horizontal structure of the 
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industry prevented this happening.94 As the evidence discussed earlier shows, during their 
careers, some promoters floated over a dozen mills in the booms before 1920. Through their 
contacts they were able to raise large amounts of equity finance and additional debt finance 
through further borrowing. In most cases they built brand new mills rather than extending 
existing factories. It is difficult to understand why, if the advantages of vertical integration 
were overwhelming, they did not build integrated plants from scratch. They could have gone 
further and invested in ring spinning and automatic looms and deployed them in these new 
factories. Instead, they stuck to mules and power looms in specialised mills. Yet they still 
demonstrated rational, profit maximising tendencies, as their demand for dividends suggests. 
Up to 1920, these dividends made them richer, and even more capable of overcoming the 
constraint of industry structure had this constraint been problematic. 
 The evidence presented here suggests an alternative view. Ring spinning and 
automatic weaving established their commercial advantages in the 1920s. Meanwhile a new 
constraint on investment was dramatically imposed by the financial paralysis of the 1920s 
and 1930s. This placed constraints on retrenchment and hence reinvestment. In the 
Lancashire case and in the general case it is sensible to consider the corporate governance 
structure as the ultimate constraint on the entrepreneur. Financial stakeholders have 
considerable power to restrict the options available to the entrepreneur.95 Although ‘creative 
destruction’ may be required, for example through the scrapping of surplus capacity, it is 
within the remit of lenders and equity holders to deny the required freedom of action to 
corporate decision-makers. It is significant that large-scale vertical integration in the industry 
occurred only from the mid-1960s, after the elimination of so many firms and their capacity 
as a result of the Cotton Industry (Re-equipment) Act (1959).96
 From the 1890s especially, managerial power was limited by the governance 
structures imposed by the mill promoters, notwithstanding the continuing expansion of the 
industry. The promoters performed an entrepreneurial role that was of its nature 
unconstrained. After 1920, when ownership was transferred to outside financial stakeholders, 
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genuine restrictions were imposed on action at the corporate level. In this sense the pattern of 
the industry’s development in the nineteenth century adversely affected its development in 
the twentieth century. It could also be said, paraphrasing an earlier debate97 that the 
governance constraint was non-problematic in the nineteenth century but problematic in the 
twentieth when Lancashire hit the problems of changed world trading conditions. It would be 
more accurate to argue that the constraint did not exist at all before 1920. As in the general 
case, in the life cycle of an industry, entrepreneurial power peaks when forecast returns 
facilitate raising venture finance but before the sale of claims dilutes control. Beyond a 
certain point the dilution process brings the requirement to satisfy outside stakeholders to the 
fore and may coincide with the onset of maturity. The same happened in Lancashire. The 
important difference here, though, was that the effects of transferring financial claims 
coincided with extraordinary vicissitudes in world trading conditions to produce a crisis and 
decline of spectacular proportions. Like the industry, the reputation of Lancashire 
entrepreneurs never recovered. 
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Table 1: Financial Policies of Lancashire Firms, 1884-1914 
 
 
 
Company   Period   Debt/Equity  DPR** 
       Ratio* 
 
       Average  Average 
       for period   for period 
 
 
Ashton Brothers  1899-1913  0.86   0.72 
Barlow &  Jones  1900-1913  1.77   0.73 
Elkanah Armitage  1891-1913  0.13   0.70 
FCSDA***   1899-1913  1.66   0.58 
Horrockses****  1887-1914  0.85   0.57 
Rylands   1884-1913  0.21   0.87 
Tootal    1888-1914  1.48   0.49 
 
Sample average      0.99   0.67 
 
 
Notes 
*Debt divided by equity where: 
Debt is defined as all borrowing falling due in >12 months. 
Equity is defined as called up share capital plus reserves. 
** Divided Pay-out Ratio, calculated as dividends payable divided by profits available for 
distribution to ordinary shareholders. 
*** Fine Cotton Spinners & Doublers Association  
**** Main constituent firm of the Amalgamated Cotton Mills Trust (ACMT) from 1920. 
 
Sources: 
Ashton Bros, Barlow and Jones, Elkanah Armitage, Fine Cotton Spinners & Doublers, Rylands, 
London Guildhall Library, Commercial Reports, Half Yearly Balance Sheets, 1899-1913. 
Horrockses, Coats Viyella Records (held by the company), Detailed Accounts, Half Yearly 
Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts, November 1887 - October 1905 and Lancashire 
County Record Office, DDHs/53, Balance Sheets, Half Yearly Balance Sheets and Profit and 
Loss Accounts, October 1905 - April 1914. Tootal, Manchester Central Reference Library, 
M.461, Board Minutes, Yearly Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss Accounts, July 1888 -July 
1914.  
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Table 2: Financial Policies of Lancashire Firms, 1920-1945 
 
 
 
 
Company    Debt/Equity    DPR 
     Ratio 
          Average, 
1920 1930 1938 1945   1920-45 
 
ACMT    0.65 0.70 0.46 2.12   0.36 
Ashton    0.41 0.94 0.91 0.30   0.41 
Barlow &  Jones  0.85 0.65 0.15 0.19   0.75 
Brierfield Mills   0.51 0.39 Nil Nil   2.54 
Crosses & Winkworth  1.35 1.62 4.64 1.22   -0.17 
Elkanah Armitage  Nil Nil Nil Nil   2.03 
FCSDA   0.92 1.24 1.21 0.88   0.71 
Hollins Mill   1.12 1.24 2.47 2.31   1.00 
Jackson and Steeple  Nil Nil Nil Nil   1.37 
Joshua Hoyle   1.11 2.05 1.98 Nil   0.91 
Rylands   0.51 0.57 1.17 0.35   1.27 
Tootal Broadhurst  0.44 0.38 0.29 0.31   0.88 
        
Sample Average  0.66 0.82 1.11 0.64   1.00 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Calculations as described in table 1. Debt equity ratios calculated at each point in time instead 
of an average for the period. 
 
Sources:  
Stock Exchange Official Intelligence. 
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Table 3: Financial Policies of Lancashire Firms, 1948-1960 
 
 
 
 
Company      Debt/Equity  DPR 
       Ratio 
 
       Average  Average 
       for period   for period 
     
 
ACMT       0.37   0.36  
Ashton       0.25   0.29 
Barlow & Jones      0.07   0.27 
Crosses & Winkworth     0.84   1.07  
FCSDA      0.33   0.71 
Jackson and Steeple     0.07   0.46 
Joshua Hoyle      0.05   0.53 
Tootal Broadhurst     0.12   0.36 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Calculations as described in table 1. For all companies, calculations are based on the period 
1948-1960 for average debt to equity ratio and 1949-1960 for DPR. 
 
Sources:  
Cambridge University Companies Database. 
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